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 An emerging trend in health quality performance incentivization is the use of physician 
quality tiering arrangements by health insurers and health benefit service plans that furnish 
benefits and coverage via provider networks.  This analysis examines the growth of physician 
quality tiering arrangements and considers their legality. 
 
Background 
 
A rarity as few as 25 years ago, physician networks are now the norm in health insurance 
coverage and health benefit service plans.  In 2006, only 7 percent of all employers offered a 
“conventional” plan, that is, a plan whose terms of coverage are not tied to a provider network; at 
54 percent, preferred provider organizations (PPOs) represented the most common type of plan 
offering that year.4  Similarly, both Medicare Advantage plans (which as of 2007 enrolled 8.7 
million beneficiaries)5 and Medicaid managed care arrangements (which enroll more than half of 
all beneficiaries)6 rely on provider networks.  In the case of publicly sponsored plans in 
particular, receipt of non-authorized, out-of-network care can potentially result in total coverage 
exclusion except for specified exempt services (e.g., emergency care and family planning 
services and supplies in the case of Medicaid).  
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as part of an ongoing project on Legal Barriers to Health Information. This analysis was originally published in the 
October 8th edition of BNA’s Health Policy Reporter and is reproduced with permission of BNA.  
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The concept of tying compensation to the quality of care is hardly a new one.  Nor (as 
illustrated by credentialing activities among hospitals and managed care organizations) is the 
notion of conditioning any, or the level of, physician membership in health care arrangements on 
the quality of their care.  As efforts to link practice quality to financing have increased, health 
plans have begun to test the use of provider network tiers, that is, network classification 
arrangements that rank their providers on certain quality and efficiency measures selected and 
calculated by the plan administrator.7  One recent study that examined the use of tiered networks 
in “high performing” employer-sponsored health plans suggests that these arrangements may be 
more common among plans offered by self-insuring employers.  No comparable information 
exists on the growth of tiering arrangements in Medicare or Medicaid managed care plans, or in 
plans offered by other sponsors, including public employers or health plans offered under 
specialized coverage arrangements such as TriCare.  Reported shortages of participating 
specialty providers in the case of Medicaid and TriCare may slow the use of tiering in these plan 
markets.  
 
An additional rationale for the growth of physician tiering might be the health care 
quality liability exposure faced in numerous jurisdictions by entities selling hybrid health care 
and coverage products to employer sponsored and other group-sponsored health plans.8  Judicial 
rulings over the years has applied both vicarious and corporate liability theories in finding 
culpability in the case of managed care entities when plaintiffs’ liability claims are framed as 
matters of health care quality rather than coverage.  Physician tiering thus might be viewed as 
one aspect of the duty incurred by hybrid health service entities to establish standards and 
oversee the quality of network care, much as hospitals engage in standard setting and continuous 
quality oversight of the performance of their medical staff.  
 
Physician tiering typically appears to be targeted at specialized, selected high cost 
procedures; tiering techniques and methods may be tied to physician performance against 
evidence based guidelines and consensus standards specified by the plan, with actual 
performance calculated via proprietary algorithms.  Both the tiering measures and the tiering 
algorithms may be proprietary (and therefore opaque) with substantial variation from plan to 
plan.9  Performance assessments may be limited to what can be ascertained through claims data 
at the individual provider level, and results may or may not be aggregated to practice group level.  
Plans also can vary in the proportion of network physicians designated as high performers.10  
 
In addition, plans may show much variation in the techniques they employ to incentivize 
member selection of high performing physicians.  Research suggests that incentives can range 
from shared information regarding physician performance to tiered cost sharing and outright 
exclusion from the network of “low performing” physicians.  How aggressively to incentivize 
enrollee choice is a matter of plan design. 11  
 
                                                 
7 Deborah Draper, Allison Liebhaber, and Paul Ginsburg, High Performance Health Plan Networks: Early 
Experiences (Center for Studying Health Systems Change Issue Brief 111, May 2007). 
8 See e.g., Boyd v. Albert Einstein, 547 A.2d 1229 (1987); Jones v. Chicago HMO  730 N. E.2d 1119 (2000).  See 
esp. corporate liability discussion in Aetna v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004). 
9 High Performing Health Plan Networks, op. cit.  
10 Id.  
11 Id.  
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Even though health plans have credentialed and overseen network performance for many 
years, with new terms and monikers, such as physician tiering, often comes a new generation of 
legal challenges that attempt to portray market conduct as somehow a major departure from 
existing conduct.  The potential for this type of challenge understandably increases when the 
affected group – in this case physicians facing close scrutiny and transparency with respect to 
their performance – fears a significant impairment in its livelihood.  Information has long been 
used – in many health care settings – to measure the quality of physician performance.  At heart, 
physician tiering is simply the latest technical and structural approach to quality performance 
measurement.  But because it is heralded as an innovation in product structure and performance,  
tiering appears to have triggered the inevitable legal response.  
 
In sum, while there has been little systematic analysis of the legal aspects of tiering per 
se, there is much precedent to draw on in assessing the legality of tiering as an aspect of plan 
structure and the liability of insurers and health plans for use of tiers.  For example, to the extent 
that tiered physician networks are viewed as an aspect of plan design, federal law would accord 
self insuring private employers governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) virtually total discretion over the inclusion of tiered networks in their plans; in the case 
of employer-sponsored plans that purchase health insurance products, tiering would be 
permissible unless prohibited by state insurance law.12  Participant information about practice 
tiers would be required as part of ERISA’s member information requirements.13  Claims disputes 
related to cost-sharing differentials tied to physician tiers presumably could form the basis of an 
ERISA claims appeal. 14 In the case of insured plans in states whose insurance laws include an 
external appeals process, coverage determinations tied to tiers also presumably might be 
appealable.15   
 
The use of tiered networks for some or all services would be possible in Medicare or 
Medicaid-sponsored plans, except to the extent that some aspect of the tiering arrangement is 
found to violate one or more federal (and in the case of Medicaid, state as well) legal 
requirements.16  
 
Although there exists no systematic study of state insurance laws that specifically 
regulate the use of tiered physician networks, news stories17 suggest that physician groups may 
oppose tiering, and furthermore, that regulators may be raising access, quality, and consumer 
protection matters as part of their general regulatory oversight functions.18   
 
What Types of Legal Issues Might be Alleged in Legal Claims Against Physician Tiering?  
 
                                                 
12 Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985);  Jones v. Kodak Medical Assistance Plan, 
169 F.2d 1287 (1999); see generally, Sara Rosenbaum, Law and the American Health Care System (2007) Part Two. 
13 Law and the American Health Care System op. cit. 
14 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132, 1133. 
15 Rush Prudential HMO Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002). 
16 Both federal Medicare Advantage and Medicaid managed care standards require that services be accessible but in 
neither case do standards specifically prohibit tiering.  
17 See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima, Doctors Rated but Can’t Get a Second Opinion, Washington Post (July 25, 2007) p. 
A1. 
18 Id.  
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 As with so many issues in health law, the evolution of health system structure and 
operations can result in legal disputes. When these disputes arise, courts turn to long-standing 
legal principles in scrutinizing new practice and financing arrangements.  Thus, while “tiered 
networks” and “high performing plans” might represent new terminology in health care “system-
speak,” the concept of partial or full exclusion from a health care group based on quality and 
efficiency is hardly a new one in health law.  Network exclusion is a long-standing issue in 
health law, whether the context is health care institutions such as hospitals, or health insurers, 
HMOs, or health service benefit plans.  The fact that longstanding legal principles bear on these 
evolving practices can be seen in legal actions to date, including privately mounted challenges by 
physicians,19 and at least one investigation by a state attorney general.20 
 
 Regardless of the legal theory chosen (and as discussed below, there may be a range of 
viable theories depending on the plan sponsor, and therefore, the applicable law), certain basic 
attributes in current health plan practices are sure to trigger one or more theories and allegations: 
(1) secrecy in both the standards used and the weights used to perform rankings; (2) the absence 
of a transparent rational basis for the methods chosen; and (3) the absence of a process by which 
physicians can examine the data on which their rankings rest and challenge errors in data or 
methodology.  
 
Where the health plan is sponsored by a self insuring private employer, ERISA 
preemption law might exempt the plan from liability under state law, at least to the extent that a 
court is persuaded that the law involves an attempt to regulate plan design or to unreasonably 
bind plan administration rather than promoting the safety and quality of health care.21  
Regardless of ERISA preemption however, depending on how it is effectuated, tiering might be 
alleged to violate certain federal laws not preempted by ERISA.  Furthermore, even where 
ERISA preemption frees an employer-sponsored health plan from state regulation, the companies 
that design tiering arrangements may work in both the self-insured and fully insured markets, 
making it a practical impossibility to use network design approaches that violate applicable law 
in some of their markets.  For this reason, paying attention to the legal risk exposures created by 
tiering practices is important.  
 
 The following is a rapid scan of the types of legal allegations that could be expected in 
response to tiering practices and in light of underlying legal principles:  
 
1. Allegations of violation of statutory or common law fair process/due process requirements  
 
                                                 
19 See Washington State Medical Assoc. et. al. v Regence BlueShield (No. 06-2-30665-1SEA, filed Nov. 29, 2006, 
Seattle WA Superior Court) (settlement announced August 2007, BNA Health Law Reported 12:153, August 9, 
2007). Another example occurred in St. Louis, Missouri, where United HealthCare attempted to introduce a high-
performance network in 2005.  Providers rebuffed the plan, alleging design flaws, deceptive representations 
regarding the cost of care, and exclusion of certain groups of providers from the rankings system.   
 
20 Doctors Rated, op. cit. reporting on a New York State investigation. See letter dated July 13, 2007 from Attorney 
General Cuomo to United Healthcare indicating plans to seek an injunction against tiering on the basis of potential 
violations of consumer fraud laws. 
21 Travelers Insurance Company v. Pataki, 63 F.3d 89 (1995).  
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 Because of the impact of network selection and de-selection on the livelihood of health 
professionals, accreditation standards for hospitals and operating standards for health plans 
typically recognize the obligations of the credentialing entities to accord fair process.22  The 
concept of fair process is grounded in the common law, and it applies even when the selecting 
entity is private, in those situations in which the impact of de-selection is fundamental to the 
economic survival of the individual subject to exclusion.23  In the case of publicly sponsored 
health plans of course, constitutional due process standards could be expected to apply.24   
 
In recent years, as states increasingly have begun to regulate the practices of network-
style insurance plans, selection and de-selection procedural requirements have become part of 
the state insurance law landscape.  State laws regulating plans’ network composition and 
selection criteria would be considered laws that are saved from ERISA preemption in the case of 
fully insured plans, while self-insured plans might be exempt.25 (A plaintiff might try to argue 
that federal common law recognizes the principle of fair process as well, although such a claim 
has not yet been raised. As noted below, a breach of fiduciary duty might be a more likely 
claim). 
 
2. Allegations of violation of federal laws regulating health plans, state insurance laws, and more 
generalized consumer fraud statutes 
 
 Where the tiering method is flawed or rests on flawed data, and misrepresentations are 
made regarding the quality of the tiers, allegations may involve liability under federal and state 
fraud statutes.  In the case of state law, the fraud statutes alleged to have been violated may be 
either specific to the insurance industry or be part of more generalized consumer fraud laws.  
Thus, allegations of fraud feature prominently in legal actions to date.26 
 
In the case of self-insured ERISA plans (which presumably would be shielded from the 
reach of state insurance laws and state consumer fraud statutes), the use of tiering might 
nonetheless be alleged to violate ERISA’s disclosure and fiduciary requirements.  This could be 
the case if material information about the tiering system is not disclosed, or if the tiering system 
itself is perceived as flawed in design and results.  The latter situation might occur if 
performance information or methods are proved to be erroneous, where the cost of care is part of 
the equation, and where the plan fiduciary is perceived as having a financial conflict of interest.27  
 
It is also conceivable that tiering practices if perceived to have been recklessly designed 
and driven by cost, could be alleged to have violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organization Act (RICO), which has been applied to ERISA plan conduct involving fraud or 
                                                 
22 Law and the American Health Care System, Part 3. 
23 Id. See also Harper v. Healthsource New Hampshire, 674 A.2d 962 (1996).   
24 Law and the American Health Care System, Part 3.  
25 Kentucky Association of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003); Law and the American Health Care 
System part 2, op. cit. 
26 Washington State Medical Assoc. v. Regence BlueShield op. cit.; letter from Attorney General Cuomo to United 
Healthcare, op. cit. 
27 Law and the American Health Care System, Part 2; Sara Rosenbaum, Phyllis Borzi, Is Health Care Quality 
Purchasing an ERISA Fiduciary Obligation? BNA Pension and Benefits Daily 6:182 (Sept. 21, 2006). 
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concealment.28  In this case, the allegation would be based on a theory that quality posturing is 
being used to deceive members into choosing the least expensive care.29   
 
3. Allegations of violation of defamation and libel common law principles or statutes 
 
 Depending on the state, defamation might be a viable theory30 if the tiering is found to be 
an unprivileged and false communication that causes damages.  Where the tiering system is 
opaque, rests on an allegedly flawed and unreliable methodology, and allows for no fair process 
to correct data and resulting ranking errors, defamation can become a viable argument since the 
impact can be the loss of livelihood and impairment to reputation.  In the case of injuries to a 
professional, the standard for defamation might be simple negligence.  The fact that the plan is 
communicating to its members does not make its communications privileged.  Furthermore, if 
the defamation causes hatred, contempt, ridicule or obloquy, and deprives a professional of his or 
her livelihood, it may be considered libelous.  
 
4. Allegations of violation of federal and state laws applicable to certain categories of sponsored 
health plans 
 
 As noted, it is possible to advance a legal theory involving ERISA violations.  To the 
extent that other laws governing specific classes of health plans also require material disclosures 
and obligate plans to ensure quality or to accord basic fair process protections to providers in 
their networks, these laws could be violated.  For example, Medicare Advantage contains 
important disclosure and quality protections, both of which might be implicated by a flawed and 
opaque tiering arrangement.  
 
5. Allegations of intentional interference with contract/breach of contract 
 
 Exclusion or the assignment to a lower tier could constitute a breach of contract in 
insurance arrangements.  The violations could take two forms.  The practice might violate the 
standards that plans are permitted to use in the selection of participating physicians.  The practice 
might also violate plans’ own agreement (or the terms of state regulated network agreements) 
that extend procedural protections to credentialing decisions, if a tiering decision is understood to 
be tantamount to a credentialing decision.  
 
6. Allegations of restraint of trade 
 
 Physicians might allege that exclusions flowing from tiering constitute a restraint of 
trade.  In the world of hospital exclusions, this type of claim has generally failed because of the 
broad latitude given hospitals under antitrust rule of reason theory to make decisions among 
economic competitors based on quality.31  This tradition has carried over to health plans and has 
been reinforced by the extraordinary discretion under antitrust theory that is given purchasers to 
select their suppliers using both quality and price discounting criteria.32  At the same time, such 
                                                 
28 See e.g., Humana v Forsythe 525 U.S. 299 (1999) 
29 Law and the American Health Care System, Part 4.  See Humana, Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299 (1999). 
30 Washington State Medical Assoc. v. Regence BlueShield, op. cit. 
31 Wilkes, Law and the American Health Care System Part 4. 
32 Kartell; Ambrose Law and the American Health Care System Part 4, op. cit. 
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claims are not out of the question, particularly where the plan’s exclusionary decision rests on 
claims of quality and the challenger can show that the standards and methods used are 
fundamentally flawed and have no rational relationship to quality. 
 
7. Allegations of violation of civil rights laws 
 
It is possible that plans’ quality tiering decisions may result in the disproportionate 
exclusion or sanction of physicians with certain personal characteristics (such as race, national 
origin, sex or disability status).  Were this to be the case, then plausible theories might arise 
under state human rights statutes and federal civil rights laws.33  
 
What Practices Might Save Physician Tiering?  
 
Despite the relative prominence given to tiering practices and potential legal liability in 
news accounts and sporadic legal actions to date, in fact, longstanding legal principles suggest 
that with reasonable adjustments, the use of quality tiering arrangements might be expected to 
pass legal muster.  Indeed, a recent legal settlement entered into by Regence BlueShield and the 
Washington State Medical Association (WSMA) and involving a legal challenge to tiering by 
WSMA, underscores the fact that transparency in the process and methods, care in the 
development of the tiering measurement system, and the opportunity to appeal the assignment of 
a tier, can, in combination, do much to save the use of tiers from claims of unlawfulness.  To the 
extent that tiering is understood as introducing an important new lever into quality improvement, 
taking care to design the system to meet minimum legal standards would be an essential aspect 
of legal risk management.  
 
The summary of the Regence/ WSMA settlement consists of the following elements: 
 
1. Prior to implementing any new or revised performance measurement program, 
the plan will give physicians an opportunity of meaningful input, including input 
on the data to be used, the methods used to compare physician performance, and 
the methods of communicating ratings and scores. 
 
2. The insurer will make efforts to offer actual, advance notice (10 days) to 
physicians that new scores are forthcoming. 
 
3. Physician scores will be posted in an electronic format, along with an 
explanation of the methodology, an explanation of the data relied on to calculate 
the score, and a means to identify the types of patients included in the calculation 
of the score.  
 
4. Physicians will have the opportunity to make a timely appeal of their scores; 
where a score is challenged on a timely basis, it will be withheld until the appeal 
is completed.  Where a physician’s challenge is outside of the time limits 
permitted for an appeal, the score will be posted but with a clear notation that a 
challenge is underway.  
                                                 
33 Law and the American Health Care System Part 3.  
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5. Determinations by the insurer regarding the accuracy of its scoring will be 
appealable to an independent external reviewer based on the same materials used 
in the external review.34  
 
This settlement illustrates a basic aspect of law, namely that, even while permitting a 
broad array of conduct,  the legal system places a premium on rational conduct that is visible to 
affected populations and allows their input.  This emphasis under law on transparency can be 
seen in the legal concepts that apply to both government and private conduct; indeed, just as the 
Regence settlement is designed to shed sunlight on tiering, the emphasis on transparency in 
conduct can be seen in a recent court decision enjoining the United States Department of Health 
and Human Services from withholding Medicare physician claims information from public 
scrutiny under the federal Freedom of Information Act.35   
 
In short, it is not classification based on quality that is illegal, nor is it the publication of 
information regarding health care quality that is illegal: it is undertaking these efforts in an 
opaque manner that tends to lead to a legal backlash.   
 
The use of transparent standards, accompanied by a transparent development process in  
setting tiers and assigning individual physicians to tiers, and a clear and accessible process for 
identifying and correcting errors that arise as tiering positions are assigned, should pass legal 
muster.  The health benefit services and health insurance industry might voluntarily adopt such 
standards as part of health plan accreditation.  Alternatively, the adoption of tiering standards and 
procedures by payers and regulators as part of health plan design and operational oversight 
would offer an alternative means of fostering tiering as a health quality tool.  Thus, for example, 
standards could be developed by state insurance regulators in the case of insured plans, the HHS 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) in the case of Medicare and Medicaid plans, 
or by the United States Department of Labor in the case of ERISA-governed plans.  
 
Even in the absence of express legal standards governing tiering, there are several reasons 
why  use of transparent and reasonably designed tiering standards and methods, accompanied by 
a timely and fair process for correcting errors, ultimately could be expected to carry considerable 
weight in the event of a legal challenge.  First, as noted, health plans sold to employers and other 
group purchasers may incur legal responsibility for the quality of their care as a matter of state 
tort law.  Second, plan administrators who also act as plan fiduciaries arguably have an 
independent fiduciary legal obligation to ensure that services used by members are of appropriate 
quality and that plan assets are properly conserved.36  Similarly, entities that sell health plans to 
Medicare and to state Medicaid agencies and other group purchasers have legal obligations to 
operate in accordance with standards of quality and efficiency, just as do the programs 
themselves.  Thus, the imperative to establish ongoing evaluation mechanisms is strong, 
                                                 
34 It is unclear if the scope of the review is de novo or on the record, but the summary of the settlement indicates that 
the evidence before the external reviewer will be that which was presented to the internal review. 
35 Consumer Checkbook Center for the Study of Services v. United States Department of Health and Human Services 
2007 WL  2381005 (Aug 22, 2007). 
36 Sara Rosenbaum, Phyllis Borzi, Is Health Care Quality Purchasing an ERISA Fiduciary Obligation? BNA 
Pension and Benefits Daily 6:182 (Sept. 21, 2006). 
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particularly where the method is linked to the selection, certification, and ongoing oversight of 
health care providers and the expansion of information available to patients.   
 
To be sure, the entities engaged in this effort are in a position to financially benefit from 
efficiency improvements and cost savings.  But courts do not reject plan administration practices 
simply because of the potential to benefit, although scrutiny may be closer.  Courts – including 
the United States Supreme Court37 – recognize the inherent tension in health care between the 
goals of financing and quality and thus seek to reconcile, rather than overturn, modern health 
care arrangements and practices that seek to fuse quality, cost, and transparency.  Indeed, this 
effort to find an accord between health care market trends and longstanding legal principles has 
been a hallmark of modern Supreme Court ERISA jurisprudence.38  Similarly, because the law of 
fraud and quality arguably favor both information and transparency in the relationship between 
health care providers and patients,39 there would appear to be no inherent reason why the use and 
publication of reliable patient information developed in a reasonable fashion would be actionable 
as defamatory or as a violation of principles of quality or fraud.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Transparent tiering standards, a transparent development process in setting tiers and 
assigning individual physicians to tiers, and a clear and accessible process for identifying and 
correcting any errors that might arise in the tiering process should ensure the legal soundness of 
these systems.  Indeed, the fact that the law fundamentally supports tiering when designed with 
care and transparency can be seen in the Regence/WSMA settlement itself, which concedes the 
inherent legality of tiering while introducing certain safeguards and principles into the use of this 
tool.  
 
                                                 
37 Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000). 
38 See, e.g., Pegram v. Herdrich and Aetna v. Davila, in which efforts to classify as illegal certain plan design 
efficiency features, including the use of drug substitution and queuing for diagnostic services, were decisively 
rejected by the United States Supreme Court. 
39 Law and the American Health Care System, Part 3.  
